Security infrastructures contain information that originates from an organization's day-to-day operations, is stored for current or future use and whose nature tends to fall into different categories. Because of the fact that virtually all organizations have grown to depend in their internal information systems to operate and take decisions, this information has to be safeguarded in order to assure its three main properties: Confidentiality, integrity and availability. Once this need is identified by an organization, the main challenge is the adequate planning and successful deployment of an InfoSec infrastructure, which are processes that are often prone to errors that lead to defective solutions, wasted resources and an increasing risk of information theft, destruction, alteration and unauthorized dissemination. The main concept addressed in this paper is the use of the Intelligence Cycle (IC) as a design tool that helps an organization to correctly assess the risks that the organization is facing, the InfoSec resources at hand and the ones that it needs, the way it will allocate these resources in order to put them to work for the benefit of the organization and the way it will monitor this infrastructure in order to assure a proper level of protection.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, most organizations rely on Information Technology (IT) to process and store all the information that is generated and handled inside them. The size, nature and origin of the data, as well as the organizations that handle/process it, can be described and catalogued using a wide range of criteria. Organizations can range from small businesses to large-scale companies and government agencies that make use of complex systems.
The information inside such systems may be freely accessed by anyone that is a part of the organization or it may be only accessed by only a few people and given special treatment because of its confidentiality, in which case, it might be classified using access permissions based on how sensitive the data is and how many users or groups can access it. When it comes to the origin of data, it can be produced internally and take many forms (documents, spreadsheets, databases, web pages, images, sound clips, videos) or it could be generated externally and enter the organization through different ways.
Having identified information as the main asset to be protected in any IT infrastructure, the goal of every InfoSec initiative is to provide the highest level of protection possible according confidentiality, integrity and availability. In order to provide a quality InfoSec service, an organization must:
1. Identify the services and assets that must be safeguarded, assigning them values according to their importance.
2. Identify internal and external threats to the most valuable assets in the IT infrastructure as well as existing vulnerabilities.
3. Establish the information needs that the IT organization has in order to know what type of information must be collected, analyzed and disseminated to provide an early warning against attacks. 4 . Integrate a combination of hardware, software and administrative resources that form the backbone of the InfoSec infrastructure 5. Establish the allocation of the InfoSec hardware and software resources (mentioned in the previous step).
Once the main asset and goals of the InfoSec infrastructure are defined, the final part of the problem lies in the need of a tool that provides direction for InfoSec practitioners in order to fulfill the steps mentioned above. The proposed solution is the integration of the Intelligence cycle as a design-oriented tool. The Intelligence cycle helps define the elements needed to establish successful processes such as requirements definition and information-related activities such as gathering, processing, analysis, dissemination and utilization. A great advantage of integrating the cycle as a is that it is not vendorspecific and is not technology-related, which makes it flexible and versatile. InfoSec practitioners can apply it to a design problem without having to think about specific brands or technologies.
II. DEFINING THE CYCLE
In order to understand the Intelligence cycle, it has to be defined thoroughly to know its composition and purpose. The cycle can be defined as a "systematic and ethical process of gathering, classification, analysis and dissemination of operable knowledge, focused towards decision makers, so that they can take preventive or corrective measures with the highest possible level of rationality" 1 . In this definition there are a number of characteristics that are particularly important:
1.
Systematic: Several parts are chained together in a predefined sequential order. They also handle a specific input (information) and produce a specific output (intelligence, or "operable knowledge").
2.
Ethical: It is intended to be used in a responsible and non-malicious way. An important aspect of the integration of the intelligence cycle with InfoSec is that it is entirely defensive, preventive, corrective and design-oriented and not considered for offensive or illegal activities ("black hat"-oriented).
3.
Operable knowledge: Operable knowledge is information that has meaning and can be used towards achieving a main goal. In the case of InfoSec, operable knowledge has design and prevention uses.
4.
Focused towards decision makers: Operable knowledge produced by the Intelligence cycle is intended to reach individuals that take decisions. These individuals may fall into a wide range, spanning from upper management down to InfoSec analysts, platform and network administrators.
5.
Preventive and corrective action: The Intelligence cycle produces operable knowledge that aids key elements of InfoSec. The effect of this information is preventive (effective platform design, risk assessment and resource allocation) and corrective (threat analysis, traffic pattern analysis, root-cause determination).
6.
High-level rationality: The application of the Intelligence cycle helps produce information after going through extensive analysis, including all possible scenarios and outcomes. This is the main element that allows decision makers to avoid unforeseen events that might affect their courses of action. The phrase "surprise is not acceptable in intelligence environments" 2 sums up this aspect of the cycle.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE CYCLE
Tello & Villarreal's definition of the Intelligence cycle provides an interconnected set of activities that must be planned, executed and managed to produce operable knowledge that aids decision makers. The parts of the cycle must be separated in order to understand their nature and purpose but also to identify which parts of an InfoSec infrastructure fall into the corresponding Intelligence cycle activities to assure proper planning of the infrastructure, which includes all the resources that will be allocated. 
IV. PLANNING
Planning can be defined as "the process of choosing a goal and developing a method or strategy to achieve that goal" 3 . This step provides guidance and direction to InfoSec managers and analysts by helping them identify important elements of the InfoSec infrastructure: Its current state (by analyzing its vital signs), its strengths/weaknesses (commonly through a SWOT analysis) and the most important facts that are known and unknown to InfoSec managers, known as Essential Information Elements. Once these elements have been identified, the Planning phase is completed with the formulation of Objectives for the InfoSec infrastructure.
Vital signs can be defined inside the Intelligence context as "the minimal elements for the viability of a business model or a national project" 4 . Taking this concept into the InfoSec realm, vital signs are the minimum necessary elements needed by the InfoSec infrastructure to provide protection for an IT infrastructure. Once this identification has been made, a preliminary diagnostic is produced, which shows the current effectiveness of the InfoSec infrastructure in relation to current goals. The next step is to perform a SWOT analysis, which is a matrix that correlates positive (Strengths/Opportunities) with negative (Weaknesses/Threats) elements present in the current InfoSec infrastructure, which can be obtained from the vital signs assessment. Up to this point, these two elements combine to give us a risk agenda based on current conditions. The risk agenda is a summarization of the current adversities that the InfoSec infrastructure is facing, assigning a level of severity or impact based in the difference between the positive and negative elements of the infrastructure The final element of the Planning phase is comprised by the identification of the Essential Information Elements (EIEs). From a standpoint of Strategic Intelligence, EIEs can be defined as "data (variables) or information crucial to reach a conclusion or judgment of value that, based in the risk agenda, achieves predetermined objectives" 5 . EIEs are comprised of all the variables that can and will affect the InfoSec infrastructure positively or negatively. EIEs include those elements that are known and unknown to InfoSec managers and analysts and these must be identified thoroughly (a brainstorming and elimination process is highly recommended) in nature, cost, complexity and difficulty (among other qualities).
Once the risk agenda has been completed and the EIEs have been identified, managers and analysts can produce clear objectives (in the form of statements) that can be used as indicators to measure the effectiveness of the InfoSec infrastructure. This is the phase in which technology and regulatory compliance are integrated to objectives since the Planning process is now able to identify risks (i.e. specific attacks and technological threats such as viruses) and regulatory requirements (i.e. Payment Card Industry or Sarbanes-Oxley compliance) that can be associated with technologies and regulatory/operational frameworks that solve problems or assist compliance.
V. INVESTIGATION AND COLLECTION
Investigation and collection "refers to a group of techniques using advanced technology, rather than human agents, to collect information" 6 . The limitations inherent to this field due to human interaction and the current state of the art of technology (in this case, Information Technology, which is the foundation of InfoSec) dictate the detail and depth to which information can be extracted. Also, information must be aligned with the objectives set in the Planning phase in order to 1) prevent information from becoming irrelevant, 2) prevent an overload of data that confuses or slows down the work of analysts and 3) contributes to the production and dissemination of false, inaccurate and/or unusable information.
The Investigation and Collection of information in the InfoSec infrastructure needs to focus on two fronts: 1) Internal information: Information that is collected directly from the IT infrastructure and that will be protected. It may be extracted directly (manual retrieval of files, logs, reports or alerts as they are generated inside collection points like application/development/database servers, PC clients, network/telecomm equipment, firewalls, storage equipment, mobile clients and any other piece of equipment relevant to the infrastructure's operations) and indirectly (retrieval of the information from the collection point using automated tools that can distinguish from different types of outputs, i.e. Critical Watch/FusionVM or Splunk).
2) External information: Information produced outside of the organization but related to threats and weaknesses that have an adverse effect on it. This information can be generated by 1) government institutions in charge of monitoring specific InfoSec issues (not a widespread method but currently gaining strength), 2) Software or hardware manufacturers that safeguard their reputation and products by offering it as a paid service or free of charge and 3) associations of professionals or enthusiasts (not associated with a company or government institution) that monitor and dissect threats for means of study/research. The use of automated tools to retrieve information are quickly gaining acceptance among InfoSec practitioners as they save considerable amounts of work and time. Splunk, which is a product mentioned above, is worth mentioning in specific because it is able to retrieve a special type of information known as machine data 7 , which is generated by IT and network/telecomm equipment in a native form and is easily manipulated through a reporting console. Also worth mentioning is the proliferation of External information produced by InfoSec enthusiasts as these sources put expert knowledge at the service of InfoSec practitioners.
VI. ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
Intelligence analysis can be defined as "A formal process which attempts to find and measure relations among variables. Although at times it may draw heavily on mathematics and numeric procedures, it is a logical and not a mathematical process" 8 . Intelligence analysis promotes a unique way of thinking that integrates possible scenarios or complements incomplete information with data that might have been isolated but is linked because of specific characteristics. This phase of the cycle is very extensive and its study can extend entire courses. In order to establish a reference that can link this phase to InfoSec, a number of analysis techniques are explained along with possible uses:
Technique Description Example

Transmission
Moving data from one point to the other.
1. Sending users information on safe use of computers using email distribution lists. 2. Sharing information between platform administrators and InfoSec administrators regarding a specific issue.
Accumulation
Storing data in one place; implies some notion of retrievability.
1. Construction of knowledge bases (KBs) that store cases and procedures regarding InfoSec incidents. 2. Keeping InfoSec configuration diaries that illustrate specific ways of setting up equipment.
Aggregation
Many data points brought together into a smaller set which is usually more easily accessed.
Use of reporting tools like
Critical Watch that can trim the number of events and produce a simplified vulnerability report. 2. Integration of specific data from different platform into custom reports deisgned by purpose-specific InfoSec analysts.
Analysis
Dissection of data, usually formal, of data in order to seek and measure relations. The introduction of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems has been proven valuable as tools that integrate information from different sources but also correlates and tracks relationships to provide answers once a threat has been identified. A SIEM system is "a complex collection of technologies designed to provide vision and clarity on the corporate IT system as a whole" that can be assembled either as an out-of-the-box solution or as a custom development 9 . InfoSec analysts can use these systems to recognize patterns and behaviors of the IT infrastructure to avert an attack or prevent one.
VII. DISSEMINATION AND UTILIZATION
Dissemination inside the Intelligence process consists in providing Intelligence products, to the right user, in a pertinent form, at the right moment and through secure mean 10 . The information produced by the InfoSec infrastructure must have the same characteristics to assure that proper actions will be taken using the information that has been collected and processed in previous steps. The information produced by the InfoSec infrastructure will not be used by all parties in the same manner, nor will it be directed to all the administrators in the underlying IT infrastructure. Special care must be exercised in order to avoid an overload of information or delivery of the wrong information to a non-intended recipient, as this information might trigger a state of confusion. Utilization of Intelligence information is based on a group of factors: -
The impulse of the Intelligence system (and its products) by upper management as an integral part of the organization and the decision-making process.
-
The quality and usability of the information generated by a SI system (in this case, by the InfoSec infrastructure, based in a SI system) -
The trust or distrust towards the SI system, accumulated over time by users and upper management This final step in the Intelligence cycle has a close relationship to the design and operation of the InfoSec infrastructure because of the way information is utilized in the end. If the InfoSec infrastructure is properly designed (by taking functional and technological requirements into account) and operated (quality analysis is performed, meaningful information is produced and such information reaches the appropriate levels of the organization), its reputation as an effective tool can be cemented towards the inside and outside the organization. This outwards effect is evident as InfoSec infrastructures are now audited and evaluated by either regulatory bodies and/or private consulting entities that certify its effectiveness. The focal point in this phase shall ultimately be the assurance that the utilization of the information produced by the InfoSec infrastructure does provide an effective level of protection by the sole action of using it.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The use of the Intelligence cycle as a design tool for effective InfoSec environments is geared towards the eradication of common mistakes made by organizations that face the challenge of building an InfoSec infrastructure from scratch or want to improve an ailing or ineffective one. The greatest advantage that this tool provides is its vendor and technology neutrality: The ability to look at the conceptual part of the problem without involving specific technologies or manufacturers provides a solution that can be adapted to the needs of any organization without any interoperability or integration problems. The use of the Intelligence cycle can be considered a logical step in an InfoSec environment because of the defensive nature of both and also because they both try to integrate assets, information and people into a cohesive unit that can generate valuable information and action geared towards the protection of an underlying element.
